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Ǯǯǫinaccuracy of public beliefs 
about the benefits system 
Ben Baumberg Geiger, University of Kent 
Introduction 
Debates about the benefits system in Britain conventionally start from two assumptions.  The first is 
that public attitudes towards benefit claimants have become harsher, a view which can be 
overstated, but in general terms is borne out by the evidence (Baumberg 2014).  The second is that 
ƚŚŝƐŚĂƌƐŚŶĞƐƐŝƐƉĂƌƚůǇĚƵĞƚŽ ‘ŵǇƚŚƐ ?held by the British public (for a typical if well-expressed 
commentary, see Beresford 2013) ? ‘DǇƚŚďƵƐƚĞƌƐ ?ŚĂǀĞƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞďĞĞŶƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚďǇĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶŝŶŐ
organisations ranging from the TUC (2013), a coalition of churches (Baptist Union of Great Britain et 
al. 2013), and think-tanks from the political left (Coote and Lyall 2013) to the right (Taunton-Collins 
2013) ?ĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐŚĂǀĞƐŝŵŝůĂƌůǇĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞĚŵǇƚŚƐ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐ ‘ƌŽŬĞŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?(Slater 2012) ? ‘ĨĂŵŝůŝĞƐ
ǁŝƚŚƚŚƌĞĞŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŚĂǀĞŶĞǀĞƌǁŽƌŬĞĚ ?(MacDonald et al. 2013, Macmillan 2011) ĂŶĚ ‘ǁŽƌŬůĞƐƐ
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ?(MacDonald et al. 2014), while LSE Professor John Hills recently subtitled his new book 
 ‘ƚŚĞǁĞůĨĂƌĞŵǇƚŚŽĨƚŚĞŵĂŶĚƵƐ ?(Hills 2014).  
 
Yet while mythbusters have fact-checked claims by politicians and the media, there has been almost 
no academic study on whether the publiĐĂĐƚƵĂůůǇďĞůŝĞǀĞƚŚĞƐĞ ‘ŵǇƚŚƐ ?ĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?
This is despite burgeoning academic literatures on public knowledge in other domains, particularly 
political knowledge (Carpini and Keeter 1996, Bullock et al. 2013), but also economics (Blinder and 
Krueger 2004), inequality (Kuziemko et al. 2015), and migration (Herda 2010).  In contrast, there are 
only a handful of academic studies over the past thirty years that examine benefits knowledge in 
Britain: rare qualitative studies that briefly touch on the issues (Briant et al 2011; Duffy 2013) and 
rare quantitative reports that only cover a small subset of the key issues (Taylor-Gooby et al. 2003, 
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Taylor-Gooby and Martin 2008, Golding and Middleton 1982).   Moreover, across many of these 
fields of knowledge there is often ĂŶĂďƐĞŶĐĞŽĨĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůƐĐƌƵƚŝŶǇĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞ ‘ƚƌƵƚŚ ?ƚŚĂƚŝƐĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚĞĚ
ƚŽƚŚĞƐĞ ‘ŵǇƚŚƐ ? ?dŚŝƐŝƐƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇƐƵƌƉƌŝƐŝŶŐŐŝǀĞŶƚŚĞƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇŝŶŚĞƌĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞƐŽĐŝĂůƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐ
enterprise (e.g. Flvybjerg 2001); sometimes these claimed  ‘ƚƌƵƚŚƐ ?ĂƌĞƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐǁƌŽŶŐ ?ĂŶĚĂƚ
ĞǆƚƌĞŵĞƐ ‘ŵǇƚŚďƵƐƚŝŶŐ ?ĐĂŶďĞĂǁĂǇŽĨĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŶŐƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌǀŝĞǁƉŽŝŶƚƐĂƐƚŚĞƚƌƵƚŚ ?ĂƐǁĞƐŚĂůůƐĞĞ ? 
 
/ŶƚŚŝƐƉĂƉĞƌ ?ǁĞƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚĞďŽƚŚƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚƉƵďůŝĐ ?ƐƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?
and how far  W and how certainly  W ǁĞĐĂŶĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƚŚĞƐĞƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐĂƐ ‘ƚƌƵĞ ?Žƌ ‘ĨĂůƐĞ ? ?We use 
eighteen datasets across six survey series, including several that are being made available for wider 
academic study for the first time.1 Before describing our methods in more detail, we look more 
closely at previous studies of levels of ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ?ĂŶĚĚĞĨŝŶĞǁŚĂƚǁĞŵĞĂŶďǇĂ ‘ŵǇƚŚ ? ? 
 
What the public knows 
It is a badly-kept secret that the public has poor aggregate levels of knowledge about science, social 
science and poůŝƚŝĐƐ ?/ŶWŚŝůŝƉŽŶǀĞƌƐĞ ?ƐǁŽƌĚƐ ? ? ? ? ?:79), "the most familiar fact to arise from 
sample surveys is that popular levels of information about public affairs are, from the point of view of 
an informed observer, astonishingly low ? ?dŽƚĂŬĞtwo typical examples: less than half of Britons or 
Americans know that the earth goes around the sun once per year (Durant et al. 1989); while many 
cannot even provide an estimate of key economic quantities like inflation, much less provide a 
correct one (TNS Opinion & Social 2010).  While it has been argued that people are often most 
accurate about phenomena they come into contact with (Taylor-Gooby et al. 2003:17), there are 
ŽƚŚĞƌƐƚƵĚŝĞƐƐŚŽǁŝŶŐǁŝĚĞƐƉƌĞĂĚŝŶĂĐĐƵƌĂĐŝĞƐŝŶǁŚĂƚǁĞŵŝŐŚƚƚĞƌŵ ‘ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶƚŝĂů ? ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶ
 ‘ůĞĂƌŶĞĚ ? ?ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ?&ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ƉĞŽƉůĞƐǇƐƚĞŵĂƚŝĐĂůůǇŽǀĞƌ-estimate the proportion of people 




However, the literature on benefits knowledge is much smaller. A few US studies look at knowledge 
of Social Security and find that the public are (on average) roughly accurate in terms of the average 
Social Security benefit cheque (Blinder and Krueger 2004) and who qualifies for Social Security 
(Barabas 2012). However, they are inconsistent in their knowledge of detailed program rules and 
tend to overestimate the incentive to work (Liebman and Luttmer 2012), and while the perception 
that Social Security will be running deficits in future is accurate (Blinder and Krueger 2004), the 
ĞǆƚĞŶƚƚŽǁŚŝĐŚŝƚŝƐĐŽƌƌĞĐƚƚŽƐĂǇƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐǇƐƚĞŵǁŝůůŐŽ ‘ďĂŶŬƌƵƉƚ ?ŝƐĚĞďĂƚĂďůĞ(Barabas 2012)..  
Greater inaccuracies are found for welfare payments, which are perceived to be a far greater cost to 
Government (e.g. Jacobs and Shapiro 1999, CNN 2011) and to be more valuable to claimants 
(Kuklinski et al. 2000) than they actually are.   
 
In the UK, there is only one relevant peer-reviewed study within the past fifteen years (although 
several non-academic polls exist; see below).  This finds that many people know that the benefits 
system is one of the largest parts of public spending, but most wrongly think that unemployment 
benefits cost the state more than pensions (Taylor-Gooby et al. 2003). Several of the British Social 
Attitudes reports also find that the value of benefits is overestimated (e.g. Taylor-Gooby & Martin 
2008), which is also supported in a qualitative think-tank report (Duffy et al. 2013), while other 
qualitative studies in the grey literature suggest that the public over-estimate benefits fraud (see 
below). Qualitative studies in peer-reviewed journals, however, have instead focussed on slightly 
separate issues, such as how benefit claimants judge other claimants to be undeserving (e.g. Chase 
& Walker 2013). Overall, while prior evidence is consistent with a priori assumptions that benefits 
knowledge in Britain is poor, these studies predominantly lie outside the peer-reviewed literature, 
and the evidence itself is scattered and sparse. 
 
Yet the actual level of ignorance is far worse than this  W for even where the public are correct on 
average, this does not mean that most people individually ĂƌĞĐŽƌƌĞĐƚ ?<ƵůŝŶƐŬŝĞƚĂů ?Ɛ(2000) 
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influential study of US welfare knowledge finds that the public on average over-estimated the 
amount spent on welfare, the average welfare payment, and the proportion of people claiming 
welfare, but under-estimated the proportion of claimants who had been on welfare for 8+ years, and 
were actually correct about the proportion who were African-American.  Yet because these averages 
balance out different kinds of wrong answers among individuals, they found that "on none of the 
individual items did a majority, or close to it, get the fact right" (p797).  The prior evidence from 
other countries and on other topics does not necessarily suggest that the public will consistently be 
biased towards negative misperceptions about benefits, but it does suggest that a widespread lack 
of knowledge is likely.  We examine both aspects of this in our analysis below. 
 
Ǯǯ 
While not always considered in the literature on political knowledge, it is important to begin by 
ƚĞĂƐŝŶŐĂƉĂƌƚƚŚĞŵƵůƚŝƉůĞĐŽŵŵŽŶŵĞĂŶŝŶŐƐŽĨ ‘ƚƌƵƚŚ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŵǇƚŚ ? ?tŚŝůĞŽŶĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐĐŽǀĞƌƐ
directly testable ƚƌƵƚŚƐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĞŵŝŐŚƚƚĞƌŵ ‘ŶĂƌƌŽǁĨĂĐƚƐ ? ? ?ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽ
ĚĞĞƉĞƌƚƌƵƚŚƐƚŚĂƚůŝĞďĞŶĞĂƚŚĚŝƌĞĐƚŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĞŵŝŐŚƚƚĞƌŵ ‘ǁŽƌůĚǀŝĞǁƐ ? ? ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ
 ‘ƚƌƵƚŚ ?ŝŶĂƌĞůŝŐŝŽƵƐƐĞŶƐĞ ?^ŽĐŝĞƚĂůĚĞďĂƚĞƐ W including those about the benefits system  W will exist 
on both levels simultaneously, as will ĐůĂŝŵƐŽĨ ‘ƚƌƵƚŚ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŵǇƚŚ ? ?dŚĞĨŽƌŵĞƌ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇŽĨ^ƚĂƚĞĨŽƌ
Work and Pensions, Iain Duncan Smith, can say that "I have no hesitation in claiming that Britain is 
broken. This claim is factual" (in Slater 2012:962) ?ĂŶĚ^ůĂƚĞƌĐĂŶĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƚŚŝƐĂƐĂ ‘ŵǇƚŚ ? ?ĂŶĚŝŶ
both cases we accept their statements as legitimate uses of language, even though the claim is not 
directly about a testable proposition.   
 
Indeed, ŵƵĐŚŽĨƚŚĞĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐĚĞďĂƚĞŽŶďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐŚĂƐďĞĞŶĂďŽƵƚ ‘ŵǇƚŚƐ ?ŝŶƚŚŝƐďƌŽĂĚĞƌƐĞŶƐĞ ?
critiquing individualistic explanations of poverty. While this has been common in recent years (such 
ĂƐ^ůĂƚĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?Žƌ:ĞŶƐĞŶ ?Ɛ 2014 ĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞŽĨ ‘ǁĞůĨĂƌĞĐŽŵŵŽŶƐĞŶƐĞ ? ? ?it goes back to Dean & Taylor-
'ŽŽďǇ ?Ɛ (1992) book Dependency Culture: The Explosion of a Myth, WĞƚĞƌdŽǁŶƐĞŶĚ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ?ĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞ
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ŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ĐǇĐůĞŽĨĚĞƉƌŝǀĂƚŝŽŶ ?(Welshman 2005), and beyond. Some of the narrow facts on which some 
individualistic accounts are based are demonstrably false, such as the existence of families in which 
three generations have never worked (MacDonald et al. 2013). Nevertheless, the extent to which 
individualistic worldviews can be described as factually wrong is contested, with others arguing that 
ƐŽĐŝĂůƉŽůŝĐǇƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐ ?ŶĞĂƌ-universal preference for rigidly structural explanations instead reflects 
widespread ideological commitments (Dunn 2014; Welshman 2005).  It is not the aim of this paper 
to present a new theory of the complex relationship between narrow facts and broader worldviews 
(which mirrors the conventional distinction between attitudes/beliefs and values, e.g. Sundberg 
2014:4.1).  For our purposes, it is sufficient to note that there is a difference between a narrow fact 
that is amenable to direct social scientific investigation and an ethically-imbued worldview that is 
not (e.g. Samuels 1973, Sarweitz, 2004), even accepting that the two are messily entangled. As such 
we restriĐƚŽƵƌĨŽĐƵƐŚĞƌĞƚŽ ‘ďĞŶĞĨŝƚŵǇƚŚƐ ?ĐŽŶĐĞŝǀĞĚŽŶƚŚĞů ǀĞůŽĨĨĂĐƚƵĂůƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? 
 
ǀĞŶŚĂǀŝŶŐĞǆĐůƵĚĞĚƚŚŝƐǁŝĚĞƌŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ?ƚŚĞŝĚĞĂŽĨĐůĂƐƐŝĨǇŝŶŐĂƉŝĞĐĞŽĨŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĂƐĂ ‘ĨĂĐƚ ? W 
 ?ĂŶŝƚĞŵŽĨĐŽƌƌĞĐƚŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŽŶĞƚŚĂƚĂĐĐƵƌĂƚĞůǇƌĞƉƌĞƐŶƚƐƚŚĞƌĞĂů ǁŽƌůĚ ? (Kuklinski et al. 
1998:147)  W is nevertheless contentious.  This is partly the ontological problem that there is no 
value-free way of expressing factual statements, but the primary difficulty is epistemological: even if 
there is a truth (within a particularly value-laden way of seeing the world), our knowledge of this 
truth is never certain.  So-called facts lie on a continuum of uncertainty, in which  ?ƐŽŵĞƉƵƌƉŽƌƚĞĚ
ĨĂĐƚƐĂƌĞŵŽƌĞŝŶĚŝƐƉƵƚĂďůǇĐŽƌƌĞĐƚƚŚĂŶŽƚŚĞƌƐ ? (Kuklinski et al. 1998:148).  Any claims that the 
ƉƵďůŝĐŝƐ ‘ŝŐŶŽƌĂŶƚ ?ŽĨĂŐŝǀĞŶĨĂĐƚŵƵƐƚĐŽŵĞĂůŽŶŐƐŝĚĞĂĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĞǆƚĞŶƚƚŽǁŚŝĐŚŽƵƌ
knowledge of this fact is certain, and inevitably involves a subjective judgement on the part of the 
speaker as where the boundary between reasonable and unreasonable interpretations lies. 
 
DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ ?ŝƚŝƐĐůĞĂƌƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐ ?ƐĂĐĐƵƌĂĐǇǁŝůůǀĂƌǇĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƐƚŚĂƚĂƌĞĐŚŽƐĞŶ ?While 
previous research shows that most individuals hold inaccurate knowledge, across the population 
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different types of inaccuracy can balance out, producing a correct average response. For example: 
ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ ?Ɛaverage perceptions of issues such as the level of the minimum wage, median incomes 
ĂŶĚƚŚĞƉƌĞǀĂůĞŶĐĞŽĨĐŽůůĞŐĞĚĞŐƌĞĞƐĂƌĞ ‘ƐƵƌƉƌŝƐŝŶŐůǇĂĐĐƵƌĂƚĞ ?(according to Blinder and Krueger 
2004), while Taylor-Gooby et al (2003) found for their set of questions on the British welfare state 
more broadly that "the most striking aspect of public perceptions is their accuracy".  On rare 
occasions it is even true that many individuals are accurate: an exhaustive review of US polls shows 
that accuracy across 112 domestic policy items varies from 6% to 96% (Carpini and Keeter 1996:80-
81).  While widespread misperceptions around key aspects of the benefits system would be 
concerning, it is not reasonable to expect everyone to know everything about every issue.  In our 
analysis, we therefore review every measure of benefit beliefs from British data that we have been 
able to obtain, leaving our judgement as to their respective relevance to the Conclusion. 
 
Methods 
dŚŝƐƐƚƵĚǇĂŝŵĞĚƚŽƌĞǀŝĞǁƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚƉƵďůŝĐ ?ƐĂĐĐƵƌĂĐǇŽĨŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞbenefits system in 
the recent past (2000-2015).  This requires two interlinked sets of analyses  W one of public 
perceptions, another of the truth of the benefits system  W which we describe in turn. 
 
Public perceptions 
To investigate public perceptions, we conducted new analyses of all the datasets that we could gain 
access to.  After reviewing publicly available databases and contacting private survey agencies and 
sponsoring charities for access to their data, we obtained eighteen different datasets across six 




While full details of the surveys are given in Web Appendix 1, they can be grouped into three levels 
of robustness.  Firstly, the British Social Attitudes surveys (BSA, 10 waves) and the European Social 
Survey (ESS) are high-quality, face-to-face surveys using random samples.  Secondly, we use online 
panels from both Ipsos MORI (2 waves) and YouGov (2 waves).  Finally, we use face-to-face surveys 
that use less robust sampling techniques: an Ipsos MORI face-to-face survey (based on a quota 
ƐĂŵƉůĞǁŝƚŚŝŶƌĂŶĚŽŵůǇƐĞůĞĐƚĞĚĂƌĞĂƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?ƐƐƵƌǀĞǇƵƌŽďĂƌŽŵĞƚĞƌ ? ?
2 waves).  In quality terms these are likely to lie between the online panels and full random surveys.   
Basic descriptive characteristics of each survey are shown in Web Appendix 2. 
 
These sampling differences must be borne in mind when interpreting the results below.  Online 
panels are increasingly used in social research and generally show similar distributions of political 
variables to face-to-face surveys using random samples, but we would expect the samples to be 
slightly skewed towards those with greater political interest/knowledge (Sanders et al. 2007, Liu and 
Wang 2014).  Levels of knowledge from the online panels are therefore likely to be upper bounds on 
population values, anĚƚŚĞƌĞƐƵůƚƐƐŚŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞƚƌĞĂƚĞĚĂƐƵŶƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶĂďůĞ ‘ĨĂĐƚƐ ?ĂďŽƵƚƉƵďůŝĐ
knowledge, but rather as the best estimate of such knowledge that is presently available. 
 
Ǯǯ 
TŽĚĞĨŝŶĞƚŚĞ ‘ĐŽƌƌĞĐƚ ?ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞǁĞŵƵƐƚŵĂŬĞĂƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞũƵĚŐĞŵĞŶƚĂďŽƵt the boundaries of 
reasonable beliefs, given inherent uncertainty about the truth.  We explain this case-by-case below.  
For questions where respondents are asked to state a percentage of the population, however, we 
adopt a general rule of using windows of ten percentage points around the correct value (or from 0-
10%, if the true value is lower than 5%).  While arbitrary, this allows respondents some margin for 
ĞƌƌŽƌ ?ĂŶĚƐĞĞŵƐƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞŐŝǀĞŶƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐ ?ƉƌŽƉĞŶƐŝƚǇƚŽƌŽƵŶĚƚŚĞŝƌĂŶƐǁĞƌƐƚŽƚŚĞŶĞĂƌĞƐƚ






KǀĞƌĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞƐŽĨďĞŶĞĨŝƚĨƌĂƵĚĂƌĞƉĞƌŚĂƉƐƚŚĞŵŽƐƚĐŽŵŵŽŶůǇĐŝƚĞĚ ‘ďĞŶĞĨŝƚŵǇƚŚ ? ?dŚĞǇĂƌĞĂůƐŽ
ĂŶŝŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝǀĞĐĂƐĞǁŝƚŚǁŚŝĐŚƚŽďĞŐŝŶ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƚŚĞƐĞĂƌĞŝŶĚĞĞĚ ‘ŵǇƚŚƐ ?ŝƐŵŽƌĞĐŽŵƉůĞǆ
to answer than it might appear. 
 
Five different survey questions have been asked about fraud.  Mostly these ask explicitly about fraud 
ĂŶĚƚŚĞŶĐůĂƌŝĨǇƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐŝƐƉĞŽƉůĞ ‘ĚĞůŝďĞƌĂƚĞůǇĚĞĐĞŝǀŝŶŐ ?ƚŚĞ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ? ?ŝŶdĂďůĞ ? ? ?Žƌ
 ‘ĚŝƐŚŽŶĞƐƚůǇĐůĂŝŵŝŶŐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?^ ?2- ? ?ĂƐŬĞĚĂďŽƵƚ ‘ĨĂůƐĞůǇĐůĂŝŵŝŶŐ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐůŝŬĞůǇ
to capture a slightly broader concept than fraud. Questions also differ in whether they ask about 
fraud as a percentage of claims or of spending ?ĂŶĚǁŚŝĐŚďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐƚŚĞǇƚĂůŬĂďŽƵƚ ?ǀĂƌŝŽƵƐůǇ ‘ŽƵƚ-of-
woƌŬďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐ ? ? ‘ǁĞůĨĂƌĞ ? ? ‘ƵŶĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĚŝƐĂďŝůŝƚǇďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐ ? ? ?&Žƌfull wording, see 
Web Appendix S3).   
 
dŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚƉƵďůŝĐ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐƚŽƚŚĞƐĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞƐŚŽǁŶŝŶdĂďůĞ ? ?dŚĞƌĞĂƌĞƐƚĂƚŝƐƚŝĐĂůůǇ
significant differences between the different questions, although whether these are due to the 
question, the survey mode or the sample is unclear.  Overall, people thought that 29-37% of claims 
were fraudulent or false, and 24-27% of spending was on false claims.  (Medians are lower than 
means, with the average person saying they thought 25-35% of claims and 20% of spending was 
fraudulent  W ŶŽƚĂďůǇůŽǁĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŚĞůĞǀĞůƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚĂƐ ‘ƚǇƉŝĐĂů ?ďǇƌŝĂŶƚĞƚĂů ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ?ƋƵĂůŝƚĂƚŝǀĞ
study).     ‘MǇƚŚďƵƐƚĞƌƐ ?ŽĨƚĞŶĐŽŵƉĂƌĞthese figures to the official Government fraud estimates, but 
there are several further considerations here.  
 




&ŝƌƐƚůǇ ?ƐŽŵĞƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨĨƌĂƵĚŝƐĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶĞŶƐŚƌŝŶĞĚŝŶůĂǁ ?&Žƌ
example, a substantial minority of unemployment benefit claimants are unwilling to take literally any 
low-status job (Lindsay and McQuaid 2004) ?/ƚƐĞĞŵƐƵŶƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞƚŽĐŽƵŶƚƚŚŝƐĂƐ ‘ĨƌĂƵĚ ? Wnearly 
all claimants want to work, such choosiness is shared in wider society (Dunn 2010), and besides, it is 
unclear whether claimants would be able to get these jobs  W but some respondents may be defining 
ƚŚŝƐĂƐ ‘ĨƌĂƵĚ ? ?To investigate this further, Ipsos MORI 2013 asked respondents to specify what they 
ŚĂĚƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚĂƐ ‘ĨƌĂƵĚ ? ?^ŝǌĞĂďůĞŵŝŶŽƌŝƚŝĞƐŽĨƉĞŽƉůĞ described it as  ?ŚĂǀŝŶŐŵŽƌĞĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶƐŽ
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇĂƌĞĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚƚŽŵŽƌĞďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐ ? (35.1% of those giving an answer),  ?ƉĞŽƉůĞĐůĂŝŵŝŶŐďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐ
ǁŚŽŚĂǀĞŶ ?ƚƉĂŝĚĂŶǇƚĂǆĞƐ ?ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝŶƐƵƌĂŶĐĞ ? (36.5%), and  ?ƉĞŽƉůĞĨƌŽŵĂďƌŽĂĚ ?ŝŵŵŝŐƌĂŶƚƐ
ĐůĂŝŵŝŶŐďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐ ? (46.1%). Indeed, a majority (61.6%) gave one of these responses  W none of which 
are usually legally defined as fraud.  Some of the divergence between perceptions and reality may 
therefore be a matter of mismatched definitions.   
 
Secondly, some fraud will go undetected, particularly cash-in-hand earnings (Dean and Melrose, 
1996), but also some organized fraud.  Indeed, in a British Social Attitudes question in 2011, 54% 
thought that it was not very or not at all likely that someone who falsely claims benefits will be 
caught.2 It is however important to separate out the detection of fraud among claimants as a whole, 
ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŝŵƉƌĞƐƐŝǀĞĞĨĨŽƌƚƐƚŽmeasure the level of fraud.  In 2012/13, a random 
sample of 26,000 cases were reviewed, initially collating information from various Government and 
local authority sources before interviewing the claimant at their home (see Web Appendix 4).  The 
Government infers that fraud is taking place either if fraud is then investigated further and proved in 
court, or if the claimant terminates or changes their claim shortly after the interview, and where 
ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐ ‘ĂƐƚƌŽŶŐƌĞĂƐŽŶƚŽĚĞĚƵĐĞ ?ƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐǁĂƐďĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞĨƌĂƵĚ-checking process.  This is best 
practice internationally, and was the only aspect of Government fraud management that was 
praised in an otherwise critical report (Gee et al. 2010:9).  The resulting fraud estimates are indeed 
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much lower than average fraud perceptions, varying between 0.3% of spending on incapacity 
benefits to 3.9% ŽĨƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐŽŶĂƌĞƌ ?ƐůůŽǁĂŶĐĞ ? 
 
It is impossible to rule out the possibility of some fraud being missed in this exhaustive exercise. 
However, given the intensive nature of Government fraud measurement, it goes too far to say that 
 ?ƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞŶŽƌĞůŝĂďůĞĨŝŐƵƌĞƐŽŶďĞŶĞĨŝƚĨƌĂƵĚ ? (Taunton-Collins 2013).  Instead, we can (subjectively) 
divide reasonable from unreasonable perceptions of fraud.  Given the difficulty in inferring 
 ‘ĨƌĂƵĚƵůĞŶƚŝŶƚĞŶƚ ? ?ŝƚƐĞĞŵƐƵŶƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞƚŽĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƚŽďĞĨĂůƐĞ if it is close to the 
estimate for fraud and claimant error combined (see Web Appendix 4).  The available fraud plus 
claimant error estimates are all below 5%, so the range considered to be correct is 0-10% (as shown 
ŝŶdĂďůĞ ?ŝŶƚŚĞĐŽůƵŵŶ ‘ĂĐĐĞƉƚĞĚƌĂŶŐĞĨŽƌ ‘ĐŽƌƌĞĐƚ ?ƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ?.   
 
From this, we classify 27-37% of respondents as correct (or 15-19% in the BSA questions, if we treat 
 ‘ĨĂůƐĞĐůĂŝŵƐ ?ĂƐĞƋƵŝǀĂůĞŶƚƚŽĨƌĂƵĚ ? ?/ŶƚǁŽŽĨƚŚĞƐĞƐƵƌǀĞǇƐ ? ? ?-63% overestimated the level of 
fraud and <10% said they did not know; in the third survey (MORI web 2013), 45% gave 
ŽǀĞƌĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞƐĂŶĚ ? ?A?ǁĞƌĞ ‘ĚŽŶ ?ƚŬŶŽǁƐ ? ?/ŶŽƚŚĞƌǁŽƌĚƐ ?ĂƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂůŵŝŶŽƌŝƚǇŽĨƉĞŽƉůĞ
accurately perceive the level of benefits fraud, but most people give overestimates.  Further 
evidence for such misperceptions comes from the National Benefit Fraud Hotline 2009-10, where 
<5% of calls led to claim being regarded as either fraud or error (FullFact 2011).  It is perhaps no 
surprise that the Government themselves have similarly accepted that  ?public perceptions of fraud in 
ƚŚĞďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐǇƐƚĞŵĚŽŶŽƚƌĞĨůĞĐƚƚŚĞƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ? (HM Government 2014, Appendix 1).   
 
Benefit spending 
Rather than assess the exact number of billions spent on the benefits system  W which would 
ƉƌŝŵĂƌŝůǇƚĞƐƚƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐ ?ƐƉƌŽďĂďůǇƉŽŽƌŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŽĨƚŚĞƐŝǌĞŽĨƉƵďůŝĐƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐŝŶƌĞĂůƚĞƌŵƐ W 
ƌĞĐĞŶƚƐƵƌǀĞǇƐŚĂǀĞĨŽĐƵƐĞĚŽŶƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐ ?ƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞrelative size of different aspects of 
Page 12 
 
public spending.  tŚŝůĞƐŽŵĞĐĂƌĞŝƐŶĞĞĚĞĚŝŶĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŶŐƚŚĞƚƌƵĞĨŝŐƵƌĞƐ ? ‘benefits for the 
ƵŶĞŵƉůŽǇĞĚ ?ĂƌĞďƌŽĂĚĞƌƚŚĂŶũƵƐƚ:ŽďƐĞĞŬĞƌ ?ƐůůŽǁĂŶĐĞ; see Web Appendix 4), there is more 
certainty here than when looking at benefit fraud. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Within public spending as a whole, social security is the largest single component  W and this is 
moderately well-known.  (Questions that ask respondents to choose the correct answer from a list of 
categories, as in this case, are shown in Table 2).  In 2001, 31.3% correctly thought that social 
security benefits were the largest area of government spending (B1), and around half (49%) thought 
that it was one of the top two areas of spending (B2), with very few (2%) thinking it was the lowest 
(B5).  Overall, more than half (63%) knew that health, pensions or working-age benefits were within 
the 2-3 biggest areas of public spending (B4), while more than 80% knew that benefits (pensions + 
working-age benefits), education or health were within the top two areas of spending (B3).   
 
However, fewer people had higher levels of knowledge : only 9% managed to name all of the top 2-3 
areas of spending (working age benefits, state pensions, and health; not shown in Table 2). And 
within the social security budget, levels of knowledge deteriorate.  Only 27% of people knew that 
retirement pensions were the largest area of spending in 2001 (and only 46% thought it was within 
the top two of five listed areas of social security), with far more people (44%) saying that 
unemployment benefits were largest (B6-9).  More recently, people were split as to whether 
:ŽďƐĞĞŬĞƌ ?ƐůůŽǁĂŶĐĞŽƌƐƚĂƚĞƉĞŶƐŝŽŶƐǁĞƌĞŵŽƌĞĞǆƉĞŶƐŝǀĞ ?B10)  W despite pensions costing ten 
times the amount of unemployment benefits.  The same picture can be seen elsewhere, whether on 
ƚŚĞƐŚĂƌĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ǁĞůĨĂƌĞďƵĚŐĞƚ ?ƚŚĂƚŐŽĞƐŽŶƵŶĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐ ? ? ? ?or how much raising the 
state pension age would save (B11).  Even accepting that the unemployment benefit costs are 




Perceptions of levels of spending on other areas of the benefits system are inconsistent.  Only 4% in 
2001 said that benefits for disabled people were the most expensive part of the social security 
system, and over 40% thought they were the least expensive, even though this was the second-
largest area of spending behind pensions (B6-9).  At the same time, people know that free bus travel 
and free TV licences for pensioners are relatively inexpensive (with over half correctly saying that 
cutting this would save the least of a range of policy options;  B12).  It is therefore unfair to say that 
the public know nothing about benefit spending.  However, there seems to be a continuing and 
considerable misperception about the relative costs of unemployment benefits and state pensions. 
 
Extent of benefit claims 
One obvious explanation for why people overestimate spending on unemployment benefits is that 
they may overestimate the number of claimants  W which we explore in this section.  Again, the true 
figure here is relatively straightforward to estimate. However, when questions ask about the extent 
of unemployment per se (including non-claimants), there is a little uncertainty (unemployment rates 
are based on sample surveys; see Web Appendix 4), and there are widespread misunderstandings 
ĂďŽƵƚǁŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘ƵŶĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚƌĂƚĞ ?ƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽ (it conventionally expresses unemployment as a share 
of the economically active population, excluding inactive people). 
 
tŚĞŶǁĞĐŽŵƉĂƌĞƚŚĞƚƌƵĞĨŝŐƵƌĞƐƚŽƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐ ?ǁĞĂŐĂŝŶĨŝŶĚƚŚĂƚƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐ
are wrong. The average respondent estimated that the unemployment rate as a share of the active 
population at any one time was 12% in 2010, and as a share of the total working-age population was 
15% in 2013 and 20-24% in 2008 (B13, A9 and B14 respectively).  (This excludes poorly designed 
ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐŝŶǁŚŝĐŚŚĂůĨŽƌŵŽƌĞŽĨƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐƐĂǇ ‘ĚŽŶ ?ƚŬŶŽǁ ? ?-8). These are all noticeably 
higher than the best estimates of the actual figures (8%, 6%, and 4% respectively), echoing past 




However, when we look across all benefits (using a question kindly run by Ipsos MORI), the average 
respondent thinks that 15% of the working-age population claimed out-of-work benefits at any one 
time in 2015 (A10).  This is perhaps surprisingly accurate (the true figure is 11.4%), particularly given 
that unemployment itself is so overestimated.  Indeed, the median perception of unemployment 
(B12) plus long-term sickness (B15) in ESS is at least 30%,3 double the perceived level of out-of-work 
benefits in the Ipsos MORI poll.  This may be for methodological reasons.  Respondents are likely to 
be swayed by the response options presented to them (Schwarz 1999), and so the extensive 
sequence of high response options presented in ESS may bias respondents to higher estimates.  
Alternatively, ESS may be more nationally representative than the other surveys that are liable to be 
biased towards more knowledgeable respondents (as above), or that people are aware that many 
unemployed/disabled people do not claim benefits. 
 
In terms of accuracy, we consistently see that only a minority (19-30%)  W a considerable one, but still 
very much a minority  W of the British public give a (roughly) correct answer to any of these 
questions.  In nearly all cases the incorrect responses were over-estimates of the levels of 
unemployment, sickness/disability or out-of-work benefit claims.  It is nevertheless worth 
highlighting that in 2015, a substantial minority (23%) underestimate the level of out-of-work benefit 
claims.   
 
Finally, we can also look at perceived trends in out-of-work benefit claims (A10-A12).  The average 
respondent in 2015 thought that benefit claims had risen fractionally since 2000, in contrast to 
administrative data showing they have fallen noticeably (from 14.3% to 11.4% of the working-age 
population).   However, there was a large spread of responses, with 34% perceiving a fall in benefit 
ĐůĂŝŵƐŽǀĞƌƚŝŵĞ ? ? ?A?ŶŽĐŚĂŶŐĞ ?ĂŶĚ ? ?A?ƉĞƌĐĞŝǀŝŶŐĂƌŝƐĞ ? /ĨǁĞĚĞĨŝŶĞ ‘ĐŽƌƌĞĐƚ ?ĂƐĂĚĞĐůŝŶĞŽĨ
roughly the correct size (a 1-7 percentage point decline), then only 21% are correct, with 66% over-
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estimating the trend (i.e. thinking that claims have stayed the same or risen), and 13% under-
estimating it (i.e. thinking that claims have fallen by more than they actually have).  The fall in out-
of-work benefit receipt is not a widely-perceived phenomenon. 
 
Value of benefits 
Many people overestimate the extent of spending on unemployment benefits, as we have seen. The 
previous section has suggested that people overestimate the extent of unemployment per se, but 
another simple explanation is that people over-estimate how much each claimant receives  W part of 
ƚŚĞǁŝĚĞƌ ‘ŵǇƚŚ ?ŽĨďĞŶĞĨŝƚŐĞŶĞƌŽƐŝƚǇƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽŝŶŵĂŶǇŽĨƚŚĞŵǇƚŚďƵƐƚĞƌƐ ?dŚĞĂĐƚƵĂůĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ
ƚŚĂƚƉĞŽƉůĞďĞůŝĞǀĞƚŚŝƐ ‘ŵǇƚŚ ? ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŝƐŵƵĐŚŵŽƌĞŶƵĂŶĐĞĚ ? 
 
The main evidence comes from the BSA using an indirect method (some of these questions have 
been analysed in the BSA reports (e.g. Taylor-Gooby & Martin 2008), although without looking 
across the full set of questions systematically).  Initially, people are asked whether someone whose 
 ‘ŽŶůǇŝŶĐŽŵĞĐŽŵĞƐĨƌŽŵƐƚĂƚĞďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐ ?ŚĂƐĞŶŽƵŐŚƚŽůŝǀĞŽŶ ?ŐŝǀĞŶƚŚĞŝƌƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ğ ?Ő ? ‘Ă
25-year old unemployed woman living alone).  People are then given the true amount, and then 
asked again whether this person has enough to live on.  Those people who change their response to 
say that the person is actually harder-up than they thought are treated as overestimating the true 
benefit, while those who change their response to say that the person is living more comfortably 
than they thought are treated as underestimating it.   
 
Not only do these questions allow us to compare understanding of different types of benefits (the 
questions variously ask about carers, unemployed people, and pensioners, varied by family type), 
but we can also look at changes in understanding from 1994-2013.  There are however two caveats.  
&ŝƌƐƚůǇ ?ŶŽŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŝƐŐŝǀĞŶŽŶŚŽǁƚŚĞ ‘ƚƌƵĞ ?ǀĂůƵĞƐŐŝǀĞŶŝŶ^ĂƌĞĚĞƌŝǀĞĚ ?tŚĞŶǁĞĐŚĞĐŬ
these values, we find that most of them are accurate, but a few are wrong (see Web Appendix 4); we 
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draw attention to these where relevant below.  Secondly, this question will give a lower bound 
ĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞĨŽƌƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐŵŝƐƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂƐƐŽŵĞŵŝƐƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐǁŝůůŶŽƚďĞƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚůǇůĂƌŐĞƚŽĐŚĂŶŐĞ
ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐĨĞĞůŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚǁŚĞƚŚĞƌďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐĂƌĞĞŶŽƵŐŚƚŽůŝǀĞon.   
 
ĞĂƌŝŶŐƚŚŝƐŝŶŵŝŶĚ ?ƚŚĞƌĞƐƵůƚƐĂƌĞƐŚŽǁŶŝŶdĂďůĞ ? ?ƐƚŚĞ ‘ŵǇƚŚďƵƐƚĞƌƐ ?ĐůĂŝŵ ?ƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞŝŶĚĞĞĚ
some benefits that people tend to overestimate.  For unemployment benefits, noticeably more 
people in recent years overestimate the benefit than underestimate it (8-11% more for a single 
woman, 27-28% more for a childless couple).  This seems to be the case for most years in which this 
question has been asked, although for the unemployed single woman in 1994 (the earliest year 
available), people were as likely to underestimate as overestimate the benefit.  Overestimates were 
also found in studies that ask people to give a figure for the level of benefits, including a family with 
two children on Supplementary Benefit in the late 1970s (Golding and Middleton 1982), and the 
couple rate of unemployment benefit in 2012 (A13, notwithstanding the problems of establishing 
the true figure; see Web Appendix 4). 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Contrary to widespread assumptions, though, people did not systematically overestimate the levels 
of other types of benefits  W indeed, in general they systematically underestimated them, believing 
that benefits were in fact lower than they really are.  This was the case for: 
- Carers ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞ ‘ƚƌƵĞ ?Ĩŝgure here is contentious (although not strictly 
 ‘ǁƌŽŶŐ ? ?ƐĞĞtĞďƉƉĞŶĚŝǆ ? ? ? 
- Unemployed single mothers for most years (1994-2004), where 14-25% more people 
underestimated than overestimated the benefit (falling to 4% in 2008).  This is a 
particularly striŬŝŶŐĨŝŶĚŝŶŐǁŚĞŶǁĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ^ ‘ƚƌƵĞ ?ĨŝŐƵƌĞƐĂƌďŝƚƌĂƌŝůǇ
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excluded Child Benefit and are therefore even lower than claimants would actually 
receive (see Web Appendix 4).   
- Pensioners 1998-2008, with 15-48% more people overestimating than underestimating 
the level of benefits for both pensioner couples and single pensioners.  This does not 
mean that most people thought pensions were too generous; even after hearing the 
true value, respondents were still far more likely to say that pensioners were  ‘ŚĂƌĚƵƉ ?
Žƌ ‘ƌĞĂůůǇƉŽŽƌ ?ƚŚĂŶŚĂĚ ‘ŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶĞŶŽƵŐŚƚŽůŝǀĞŽŶ ? ? ? ?-64% vs. 2-11% respectively, 
analyses not shown).  But it does show that the assumption that most people 
systematically overestimate the level of state benefits is wrong. 
It is possible to summarize this by saying that people tend to overestimate unemployment benefits, 
but considerably underestimate support to pensioners and unemployed families.  Yet alongside this, 
ŝƚŝƐƐƚƌŝŬŝŶŐũƵƐƚŚŽǁǀĂƌŝĂďůĞƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞ ?/ŶŵŽƐƚĐĂƐĞƐ, sizeable minorities of people 
were both underestimating and overestimating the level of benefits (and as noted previously, the 
question design means that these are lower bounds on misperceptions).  If we look at the single 
question that asks people to give the exact value of unemployment benefits for a couple (A13, and 
noting the issues over the true value in Web Appendix 4), then over 10% estimate this as less than 
half of the actual value, and over 10% estimate this to be more than twice the actual value.  As Philip 
Converse famously put it when describing political knowledge  (in Barabas 2012), public knowledge 
has a low mean but a high variance. 
 
Other beliefs: better off in work, and JSA durations 
^ĞǀĞƌĂůŽĨƚŚĞŵǇƚŚďƵƐƚĞƌƐƚĂůŬĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞ ‘ŵǇƚŚ ?ƚŚĂƚpeople are better-off on benefits than in-work 
 ?ĂŶĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚĚĂƚĞƐďĂĐŬƚŽƚŚĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞŽĨ ‘ůĞƐƐĞƌ ůŝŐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ?ŝŶƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?WŽŽƌ>ĂǁĂŶĚďĞǇŽŶĚ ? ?
which depends on perceptions of incomes both out-of-work and in-work. There is some evidence 
that people do underestimate in-work incomes; a DWP report using similar questions to the 
previous section (Kelly 2008) finds considerable underestimates of how much government support a 
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two-parent two-child family with one earner would receive, perhaps reflecting increases in spending 
on such benefits in the 2000s (which had complex implications for how much people were better-off 
to progress at work; Brewer and Shephard 2004).   
 
Similarly, a TUC mythbuster (using B14) claims that only 21% of people know that an unemployed 
couple with two children would be better-off if one of them worked 30hrs/wk at the minimum 
ǁĂŐĞ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞĐůĂŝŵĞĚ ‘ƚƌƵĞĨŝŐƵƌĞ ?ŚĞƌĞŽĨ ? ? ? ? ?ǁŬďĞƚƚĞƌŽĨĨ ?ƐĞĞ ? ? ?ŝƐƉƌŽďĂďůǇĂŶŽǀĞƌ-
estimate, partly because the TUC seem to have slightly over-estimated how much better-off people 
would be if they worked work (we make this £128), but more importantly because this figure 
excludes other costs and income losses that people would face in taking up employment (see Web 
Appendix 4).  While it still seems likely that this unemployed couple would be better-off in work (and 
 ‘ďĞƚƚĞƌ-ŽĨĨĐĂůĐƵůĂƚŽƌƐ ?ĂƌĞĂƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƉĂƌƚŽĨǁĞůĨĂƌĞ-to-work support), the extent that perceptions 
match reality is difficult to estimate in the absence of further information.   
 
WhŝůĞůĞƐƐĐŽŵŵŽŶůǇĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚƚŚĂŶƚŚĞŝƐƐƵĞƐĂďŽǀĞ ?ǁĞĐĂŶĂůƐŽůŽŽŬĂƚƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ
ƚŚĞĚƵƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƵŶĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚďĞŶĞĨŝƚĐůĂŝŵƐ ?dŚĞƉƵďůŝĐ ?ƐĂǀĞƌĂŐĞ ?ŵĞĂŶ ?ĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞŽĨƚŚĞ
ƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶŽĨ:ŽďƐĞĞŬĞƌ ?ƐůůŽǁĂŶĐĞĐůĂŝŵƐůĂƐƚĨŽƌĂƚůĞĂƐƚĂǇĞĂƌŝƐ48% in 2012 (in A15) and 38% in 
2015 (Kellner 2015) ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ƚƌƵĞ ?ǀĂůƵĞĐůĂŝŵĞĚŝŶƚŚĞŝŶŝƚŝĂůdhŵǇƚŚďƵƐƚŝŶŐŝƐ ? ?A? ?
whereas Kellner claims it is 10%.  The latter claim in particular is debatable  W it ignores JSA claimants 
who temporarily leave JSA but return to claim  W with more plausible figures being either 32% or 40% 
 ?ƐĞĞtĞďƉƉĞŶĚŝǆ ? ? ?/ĨǁĞĂůůŽǁĨŝǀĞƉĞƌĐĞŶƚĂŐĞƉŽŝŶƚƐĞŝƚŚĞƌƐŝĚĞŽĨƚŚŝƐĂƐ ‘ĐŽƌƌĞĐƚ ? ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ?
then 24% are correct, with 23% giving underestimates and 54% giving overestimates.  This seems to 
be an area of ignorance rather than misperception (perhaps unsurprisingly given that it is not much-






/ŶƚĂůŬŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚ ‘ƚƌƵƚŚƐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŵǇƚŚƐ ? ?ŝƚŝƐŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇƚŽďĞĐůĞĂƌĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞůŝŵŝƚĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨŽƵƌĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ?
Firstly, there is always a risk of non-response bias in sample surveys, and such biases are likely to be 
greater for the online panels that we include in our review.  However, previous studies suggest that 
online samples will be biased to more knowledgeable respondents, and the public may therefore be 
even less informed than our results suggest.  Secondly, our findings may not strictly reflect 
 ‘ŝŐŶŽƌĂŶĐĞ ? ?dŚĞƌĞŝs evidĞŶĐĞƚŚĂƚŵŽŶĞƚĂƌǇŝŶĐĞŶƚŝǀĞƐŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐ ?ĂĐĐƵƌĂĐǇĂŶĚ
decrease their partisan bias (Prior and Lupia 2008, Bullock et al. 2013), and misperceptions may 
therefore reflect a lack of effort on the part of the respondent to provide accurate responses, with 
ĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚ ‘ďĞůŝĞĨƐ ?ŝŶƐƚĞĂĚďĞŝŶŐũƵƐƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƉŽůŝƚŝĐŝǌĞĚĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐ ? 
 
&ŝŶĂůůǇ ?ǁĞƵŶĨŽƌƚƵŶĂƚĞůǇĚŽŶŽƚŚĂǀĞƵŶĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞĂďůĞ ‘ĨĂĐƚƐ ?ƚŽǁŚŝĐŚǁĞĐĂŶĐŽŵƉĂƌĞƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐ ?Ɛ
views  W much as this is often the way that mythbusters have been framed.  Still, uncertainty is not 
ƚŚĞƐĂŵĞĂƐĂŶĂďƐĞŶĐĞŽĨŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ?/ŶĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞĂĐĐƵƌĂĐǇŽĨƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐ ?ƐďĞůŝĞĨƐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞ
benefits system, we make a judgement  W necessarily subjective, but both transparent and grounded 
in the best available evidence  W  ĂƐƚŽǁŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘ƚƌƵƚŚ ?ŝƐ ?ĂŶĚŚŽǁĐůŽƐĞƚŽƚŚŝƐƚƌƵƚŚĂƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚ
ŚĂƐƚŽďĞƚŽďĞĐŽƵŶƚĞĚĂƐ ‘ĐŽƌƌĞĐƚ ? ?'ŝǀĞŶƚŚĞǁŝĚĞƌĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐŝŶŐďĞƚƚĞƌƋƵĂŶƚŝƚĂƚŝǀĞ
social science among academics, students and the wider public (a movement we are involved in 
through the Kent Q-Step Centre), we hope that the information in this paper will enable readers to 
interrogate the facts for themselves, rather than simply defer to them. 
 
Conclusions 
tŚŝůĞƚŚĞŝĚĞĂƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚƉƵďůŝĐďĞůŝĞǀĞŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞ ‘ŵǇƚŚƐ ?ĂďŽƵƚ the benefits system is 
widespread, there is little previous evidence as to what the public believe, and even less as to 
whether such beliefs are accurate.  Using 46 measures across 18 different datasets, this paper has 
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shown  W against such expectations  W that there are some areas where people misperceive the 
benefits system in ways that do not seem likely to lead to harsh attitudes.  In particular, people tend 
to underestimate the value of benefits for pensioners and unemployed people with children.  A 
substantial minority (nearly one in four) also underestimate the level of out-of-work benefit claims.  
And there are even some areas about which the public are (on average) relatively accurate.  For 
example, the average person is surprisingly accurate in knowing the share of the population who 
currently claim out-of-work benefits.   
 
zĞƚŽǀĞƌĂůů ?ƚŚŝƐƉĂƉĞƌŚĂƐƐŚŽǁŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌƐŽĨ ‘ŵǇƚŚďƵƐƚĞƌƐ ?ĂƌĞĐŽƌƌĞĐƚ ?<ŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞ
benefits system is low, as even where the public are right on average, on almost no measure do 
more than one-third of individuals provide a correct answer as we define it. And the public are often 
not right on average. People wildly overestimate unemployment benefits compared to pensions, 
and overestimate how much unemployment claimants without children receive.  Half of people 
believe that out-of-work benefit claims have risen in the past fifteen years, whereas they have fallen 
noticeably.  And while it is difficult to know the true level of benefit fraud exactly, the public 
overestimate fraud compared to any reasonable figure.  
 
Implications 
The implicit  W and often explicit claim (TUC 2013, Hills 2014)  W in most of the mythbusters is that 
these myths drive negative attitudes towards benefit claimants. However, it is difficult to test 
empirically whether this is true. Elsewhere, we show that many  W but not all  W of these beliefs are 
associated with the vŝĞǁƚŚĂƚďĞŶĞĨŝƚĐůĂŝŵĂŶƚƐĂƌĞƵŶĚĞƐĞƌǀŝŶŐ ?ĞǀĞŶĂĨƚĞƌĐŽŶƚƌŽůůŝŶŐĨŽƌƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ
political affiliations (AUTHOR CITATION 1). Based on this, and wider experimental evidence, we 
ĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚŝƚƐĞĞŵƐůŝŬĞůǇƚŚĂƚƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐĂƌĞůŝŶŬĞĚ ?ŝĨŝŶĂĐŽŵƉůĞǆǁĂy) to beliefs. However, 
there is a large caveat here: there is far more to getting public support for the benefits system than 
simply mythbusting  W those times (e.g. post-war Britain) and places (e.g. Nordic countries) in which 
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the public see benefit claimants as more deserving are not necessarily characterized by accurate 
perceptions of benefits, and the evidence suggests mythbusting itself is unlikely to consistently 
produce strong changes in attitudes (AUTHOR CITATION 2). The role of benefit myths in public 
attitudes should not be overstated, yet neither should it be denied. 
 
&ŝŶĂůůǇ ?ƚŚŝƐůĞĂĚƐƵƐďĂĐŬƚŽƚŚĞ ‘ŵǇƚŚďƵƐƚĞƌƐ ?ǁŝƚŚǁŚŝĐŚǁĞďĞŐĂŶ ?/ƚŝƐĐůĞĂƌƚŚĂƚƉŽůŝƚŝĐŝĂŶƐĂŶĚ
the media do encourage the public to misperceive the benefits system (see Baumberg et al. 2012)  W 
ignorance, like knowledge, is socially produced (Slater 2012). The actors best placed to tackle this are 
the UK Statistics Authority (via changes to their Code of Practice for Statistics) and public providers 
of benefit statistics (not least the DWP), and the recommendations in Baumberg et al (2012:88-89) 
therefore apply here. But to the extent that the providers of statistics are unwilling to take steps to 
improve public knowledge, then the best that we can do is to support those organisations that are 
trying to reward truthfulness and embarrass misinterpretations  W ƐƵĐŚĂƐ ‘&ƵůůĨĂĐƚ ?
(http://fullfact.org)  W in the hope that a society that incentivizes truthfulness in the long run will 
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Table 1: Accuracy of public perceptions of the benefits system (continuous variables) 



























































Perceptions of benefit fraud                 
A1 Fraud as % of out-of-ǁŽƌŬďĞŶĞĨŝƚĐůĂŝŵƐ ? ? ? ? ?1 29.2 25 0.0 to 10.0 31% (29-33) 0% 61% 8% 
A2 &ĂůƐĞĐůĂŝŵƐĂƐA?ŽĨĚŝƐĂďŝůŝƚǇĐůĂŝŵƐ ? ? ? ? ?2 34.2 30 0.0 to 10.0 19% (18-21) 0% 73% 8% 
A3 &ĂůƐĞĐůĂŝŵƐĂƐA?ŽĨƵŶĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚĐůĂŝŵƐ ? ? ? ? ?2 37.2 35 0.0 to 10.0 15% (14-16) 0% 78% 7% 
A4 &ƌĂƵĚĂƐA?ŽĨǁĞůĨĂƌĞƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐ ? ? ? ? ?3 24.1 20 0.0 to 10.0 27% (24-30) 0% 45% 28% 
A5 &ƌĂƵĚĂƐA?ŽĨǁĞůĨĂƌĞƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐ ? ? ? ? ?5 26.9 20 0.0 to 10.0 37% (35-40) 0% 63% 0% 
Perceptions of spending on benefits                 
A6 Bens for unemployed as % of welfare budget 20125 41 40 0.0 to 13.0 9% (8-11) 0% 91% 0% 
Perceptions of level of claims among working-age population               
A7 Unemployed as % of economically active 20076 9.5 9 0.4 to 10.4 23% (20-26) 0% 14% 63% 
A8 Unemployed as % of economically active 20096 10.5 10 2.7 to 12.7 29% (27-32) 5% 19% 47% 
A9 Unemployed as % of population 20133 22.2 15 1.0 to 11.0 29% (27-32) 0% 48% 23% 
A10 Out-of-work benefit claims as % of pop 20154 23.0 15 6.4 to 16.4 28% (25-30) 23% 49% 0% 
A11 Out-of-work benefit claims as % of pop 20004 19.6 15 9.3 to 19.3 26% (24-29) 33% 41% 0% 
A12 Trend in out-of-work benefit claims 2000-20154 3.3 1 -7.0 to -1.0 21% (19-23) 13% 66% 0% 
Perceptions of value of benefits                 
A13 hŶĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚďĞŶĞĨŝƚ ?ĐŽƵƉůĞǁŝƚŚ ?ŬŝĚƐ ? ? ? ? ?5 £183 130 £100-125 21% (19-23) 29% 50% 0% 
A14 How much better of in min wage job* 20125 -£19 -20 £100-150 4% (3-5) 85% 1% 10% 
Other perceptions of the benefits system                 
A15 % initial JSA claimants who claim for 12mths 2012*5 48 50 27 to 45 24% (21-26) 23% 54% 0% 
* DĂũŽƌ ? 退 DŝŶŽƌŝƐƐƵĞƐĂƌŽƵŶĚƚŚĞ ?ƚƌƵĞ ?ĨŝŐƵƌĞŐŝǀĞŶ- see text & Web Appendix 4 
Source/mode: 1 2012 MORI/F2F; 2 2007 BSA/F2F; 3 2013 MORI/web; 4 2015 MORI/web; 5 2012 YouGov/web; 6 Eurobarometer/phone. 
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Table 2: Accuracy of public perceptions of the benefits system (categorical variables) 
    
Year  







Perceptions of spending on benefits 
B1 Largest area of government spending 2001 (BSA F2F) Social security benefits 31.3% 64.5% 4.2% 3275 
B2 1st or 2nd largest area of govt spending 2001 (BSA F2F) Social security benefits 49.3% 46.5% 4.2% 3275 
B3 1st or 2nd largest area of govt spending 2001 (BSA F2F) Benefits, educ. or health 84.3% 11.5% 4.2% 3275 
B4 2-3 biggest areas of government spending 2013 (MORI web) 
Health or pensions, (or 
benefits if 3rd given) 
63.3% 25.8% 10.9% 1015 
B5 Smallest area of govt spending 2001 (BSA F2F) 
Housing or public transport 
or overseas aid 
49.0% 47.1% 3.9% 3275 
B6 Largest area of social security spending 2001 (BSA F2F) Retirement pensions 27.0% 69.3% 3.8% 3275 
B7 1st or 2nd largest of social security spending 2001 (BSA F2F) Retirement pensions 46.2% 50.0% 3.8% 3275 
B8 2nd largest area of social security spending 2001 (BSA F2F) 
Children or disability 
benefits 
29.5% 65.9% 4.6% 3275 
B9 Smallest area of social security spending 2001 (BSA F2F) 
Unemployment or single 
parent benefits 
20.0% 75.9% 4.1% 3274 
B10 Which costs more, JSA or state pension? 2013 (MORI web) Pensions 46.5% 40.4% 13.1% 1015 
B11 Which policy option would save most? 2013 (MORI web) Raising state pension age 16.4% 63.7% 19.9% 1015 
B12 Which policy option would save least? 2013 (MORI web) 
TV licences / bus travel for 
pensioners 
51.4% 28.2% 20.4% 1015 
Perceptions of level of claims among working-age population 
B13 Unemployment as % of active population 2010 (YouGov web) 8 percent 27.3% 51.6% 21.1% 992 
B14 Unemployed & looking for work as % of pop 2008 (ESS F2F) 0-4% or 5-9% (exact=4.3%) 18.5% 78.0% 3.5% 2351 
B15 Long-term sick & disabled as % of pop 2008 (ESS F2F) 0-4% or 5-9% (exact=5.7%) 30.1% 65.0% 4.8% 2351 
Perceptions of value of benefits 




Table 3: Accuracy of public perceptions of the value of benefits (British Social Attitudes, various years) 
Perceived level of benefits after rent 












Unemployed single woman on £45, 1994 18.8% 16.1% 57.6% 7.5% 1160 
Unemployed single woman on £47, 1995 ? 16.3% 21.1% 53.7% 8.9% 1228 
Unemployed single woman on £52, 2000 15.6% 23.6% 50.7% 10.1% 3415 
Unemployed single woman on £72, 2013 13.1% 23.8% 51.7% 11.4% 3231 
Unemployed couple w/o kids on £79, 1998 A 10.1% 37.2% 45.1% 7.5% 1569 
Unemployed couple w/o kids on £88, 2005 8.0% 35.9% 43.4% 12.8% 3177 
Unemployed single mother on £77, 1994 ? 34.3% 9.1% 50.5% 6.2% 1159 
Unemployed single mother on £78, 1995 ? 24.3% 10.4% 59.4% 5.9% 1227 
Unemployed single mother on £95, 2000 ? 31.6% 9.7% 51.4% 7.3% 3413 
Unemployed single mother on £130, 2004* 27.3% 11.9% 51.6% 9.2% 3175 
Unemployed single mother on £130, 2008 ? 19.3% 15.7% 54.8% 10.3% 3340 
Single pensioner on £82, 2000 ? 43.5% 5.0% 48.0% 3.4% 3405 
Single pensioner on £105, 2004 29.8% 10.7% 55.6% 3.9% 3175 
Single pensioner on £119, 2008 ? 26.1% 10.8% 58.7% 4.4% 3343 
Pensioner couple on £103, 1998 A 38.5% 9.6% 48.3% 3.7% 1573 
Pensioner couple on £171, 2005 ? 51.9% 3.8% 39.4% 4.9% 3180 
Non-working carer on £146, 2004* 24.8% 11.6% 56.4% 7.2% 3168 
* = Major Issues around the 'true' figure - see text & Web Appendix 4 
A Slightly different wording ('married couple' in 1998, rather than 'couple living together' in 2005) 
 
 
  
